Deductive Algorithmic Knowledge by Pucella, Riccardo
ar
X
iv
:c
s/0
40
50
38
v3
  [
cs
.A
I] 
 18
 Ja
n 2
00
6
Deductive Algorithmic Knowledge∗
Riccardo Pucella
Northeastern University
Boston, MA 02115 USA
riccardo@ccs.neu.edu
Abstract
The framework of algorithmic knowledge assumes that agents use algorithms to compute
the facts they explicitly know. In many cases of interest, a deductive system, rather than a
particular algorithm, captures the formal reasoning used by the agents to compute what they
explicitly know. We introduce a logic for reasoning about both implicit and explicit knowl-
edge with the latter defined with respect to a deductive system formalizing a logical theory for
agents. The highly structured nature of deductive systems leads to very natural axiomatizations
of the resulting logic when interpreted over any fixed deductive system. The decision prob-
lem for the logic, in the presence of a single agent, is NP-complete in general, no harder than
propositional logic. It remains NP-complete when we fix a deductive system that is decidable
in nondeterministic polynomial time. These results extend in a straightforward way to multiple
agents.
1 Introduction
It is well known that the standard model of knowledge based on possible worlds is subject to the
problem of logical omniscience, that is, the agents know all the logical consequences of their knowl-
edge [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995, Chapter 9]. Thus, possible-world definitions of
knowledge make it difficult to reason about the knowledge that agents need to explicitly compute in
order to make decisions and perform actions, or to capture situations where agents want to reason
about the knowledge that other agents need to explicitly compute in order to perform actions.
This observation leads to a distinction between two forms of knowledge, implicit knowledge and
explicit knowledge (or resource-bounded knowledge), a distinction long recognized [Rosenschein
1985]. The classical AI approach known as the interpreted symbolic structures approach, where
knowledge is based on information stored in data structures of the agent, can be seen as an instance
of explicit knowledge. In contrast, the situated automata approach, which interprets knowledge
based on information carried by the state of the machine, can be seen as an instance of implicit
knowledge. Levesque [1984] makes a similar distinction between implicit belief and explicit belief.
While the possible-worlds approach is taken as the standard model for implicit knowledge, there
is no standard model for explicit knowledge. A general approach appropriate for many situations
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium on Artificial
Intelligence and Mathematics, AI&M 22-2004, 2004. This work was mostly done while the author was at Cornell
University.
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is that of algorithmic knowledge [Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1994]. In the algorithmic knowledge
framework, the explicit knowledge of an agent is given by a knowledge algorithm that the agent uses
to establish whether he knows a particular fact. Algorithmic knowledge is sufficiently expressive to
capture a number of approaches to resource-bounded reasoning that have appeared in the literature
[Levesque 1984; Konolige 1986; Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis 1990].1
The generality of the algorithmic knowledge approach makes it ideal as a modeling framework.
One consequence of that generality, however, is that there are no nontrivial logical properties of
algorithmic knowledge proper, unless we focus on specific classes of knowledge algorithms. This
consequence is important if the framework is to be used as a specification language for properties of
multiagent systems, amenable to automated verification. In such a setting, we would like a class of
knowledge algorithms that can capture properties of interest for the verification task at hand, while
retaining enough structure to yield a tractable or analyzable framework. This structure will typically
implies a number of properties of the corresponding algorithmic knowledge operator, which can be
used to study properties of multiagent systems purely deductively. This general observation leads
naturally to a program of studying interesting classes of knowledge algorithms.
In this paper, we study a form of algorithmic knowledge, deductive algorithmic knowledge,
where the explicit knowledge of agents comes from a logical theory expressed by a deductive sys-
tem made up of deduction rules, in which the agents perform their reasoning about the facts they
know. Many useful forms of explicit knowledge can be formalized using deductive systems. For in-
stance, Horn theories [Selman and Kautz 1996], which have been used to approximate more general
knowledge bases, fit into this framework. Explicit knowledge via a deductive system can be viewed
as a form of algorithmic knowledge, where the knowledge algorithm used by an agent attempts to
infer whether a fact is derivable from the deduction rules provided by the agent’s deductive system.
Among other advantages, viewing deductive algorithmic knowledge as an instance of algorithmic
knowledge lets us model “feasible” explicit knowledge, by considering deductive systems whose
corresponding knowledge algorithm is efficient (e.g., runs in polynomial time). The approach to
modeling explicit knowledge through deductive systems is essentially that of Konolige [1986]. The
basic idea, which we review in Section 2, is that a deductive system is a set of rules that describe
how to infer new facts from old facts. We take the initial facts of an agent to be his observations,
that is, what the agent can determine simply by examining his local state.
We describe in Section 3 a logic for reasoning about both implicit knowledge and deductive
algorithmic knowledge, with formulas Kϕ to express implicit knowledge of ϕ, and Xϕ to ex-
press deductive algorithmic knowledge of ϕ. For simplicity, the logic we present is propositional,
although there is no difficulty in extending it to a first-order setting. (Of course, the standard ques-
tions about interactions between quantification and modal operators arise in such a setting.) Why
reason about two forms of knowledge? It turns out that in many situations, one wants to reason about
both forms of knowledge. Intuitively, implicit knowledge is useful for specifications and describes
“ideal” knowledge, while deductive algorithmic knowledge is useful to capture the knowledge that
agents can actually compute and use. Consider the following example. In previous work, we showed
how the framework of algorithmic knowledge could be used to reason about agents communicating
through cryptographic protocols [Halpern and Pucella 2002]. Algorithmic knowledge is useful to
1While we focus on knowledge in this paper, much of our development applies equally well to belief. In fact, since we
do not assume that knowledge algorithms necessarily return the correct answer, one could argue that the kind of knowl-
edge provided by knowledge algorithms is really belief. For consistency with the literature on algorithmic knowledge,
however, we shall continue to use the terminology “algorithmic knowledge”.
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model an adversary that has certain capabilities for decoding the messages he intercepts. There are
of course restrictions on the capabilities of a reasonable adversary. For instance, the adversary may
not explicitly know that he has a given message if that message is encrypted using a key that the
adversary does not know. To capture these restrictions, Dolev and Yao [1983] gave a now-standard
description of capabilities of adversaries. Roughly speaking, a Dolev-Yao adversary can decom-
pose messages, or decipher them if he knows the right keys, but cannot otherwise “crack” encrypted
messages. The adversary can also construct new messages by concatenating known messages, or
encrypting them with a known encryption key. It is natural to formalize a Dolev-Yao adversary us-
ing a deductive system that describes what messages the adversary possesses based on the messages
he has intercepted, and what messages the adversary can construct. This lets us describe properties
such as “the adversary can compute (i.e., explicitly knows) the secret exchanged during the protocol
run”. To capture the fact that some other agent in the system knows that a secret exchanged during
the protocol run in fact remains a secret from the adversary, we can use implicit knowledge, as in
“agent A knows (i.e., implicitly knows) that the adversary cannot compute (i.e., explicitly knows)
the secret exchanged during the protocol run”. In this sense, specifications can refer to both kinds
of knowledge. (The specification above requires an extension of the logic to handle multiple agents;
see Section 6.)
A key operator in the logic is the operator Ob that identifies the observations made at a state.
In a precise sense, this operator is the connection between implicit knowledge and explicit knowl-
edge: deductive algorithmic knowledge uses observations as the initial facts from which further
facts explicitly known are derived, while implicit knowledge uses observations to distinguish states,
in that two states are indistinguishable exactly when the agent has the same observations in both
states. Thus, we can study the interaction between implicit and explicit knowledge, and go be-
yond previous work that only attempts to model explicit knowledge [Konolige 1986; Giunchiglia,
Serafini, Giunchiglia, and Frixione 1993]. Our work shows one way to combine a standard possible-
worlds account of implicit knowledge with a deductive system representing the explicit knowledge
of agents, and to reason about both simultaneously.
A principal goal of this paper is to study the technical properties of the resulting logic, such as
axiomatizations and complexity of decision problems, and see how they relate to properties of the
deductive systems. In Section 4, we study axiomatizations for reasoning about specific deductive
systems. Not surprisingly, if we do not make any assumption on the deductive system, there are very
few properties captured by the axiomatization, which is essentially a slight extension of well-known
axiomatizations for implicit knowledge. However, if we restrict our attention to models where the
agent uses a specific deductive system, then the properties of X depend on that deductive system.
Intuitively, we should be able to read off the properties of X from the deduction rules. We formalize
this intuition by showing that we can derive sound and complete axiomatizations for our logic with
respect to models equipped with a specific deductive system, where the axiomatization is derived
mechanically from the rules of the deductive system.
In Section 5, we address the complexity of the decision problem for the logic in the presence of
a single agent, that is, the complexity of deciding if a formula of the logic is satisfiable with respect
to a class of models. Without any assumption on the deductive systems, deciding satisfiability is
NP-complete; this is not surprising, since the logic in that context is essentially just a logic of
implicit knowledge, known to be NP-complete [Ladner 1977] when there is a single agent. If we
fix a specific deductive system, then deciding satisfiability with respect to the class of models using
that deductive system is NP-hard, and it is possible to show NP-completeness when the deductive
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system is itself decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time and the models considered have a
small number of observations at each state.
In Section 6, we consider a natural extension of our framework to reason about multiple agents.
This is needed to study the Dolev-Yao example given above in its full generality, or any interesting
example from the multiagent systems literature. The extension is straightforward, and many of the
results generalize in the obvious way, justifying our decision to focus on the single agent model for
the bulk of the paper. For instance, the complexity of the decision problem when there are multiple
agents becomes PSPACE-complete, again following from logics of implicit knowledge themselves
having PSPACE-complete decision problems [Halpern and Moses 1992] in the presence of multiple
agents. The proofs of our technical results are deferred to the appendices.
2 Deductive Systems
We start by defining the framework in which we capture the logical theories of the agents, that is,
their deductive or inferential powers. We distinguish the logical theories of the agents from the logic
that we introduce in the next section to reason about a system and what agents in the system know.
We can therefore model agents with different inferential powers, without affecting the logic itself.
Following common practice, we take deductive systems as acting over the terms of some term
algebra. More precisely, assume a fixed finite signature Σ = (f1, . . . , fn), where each fi is an
operation symbol, with arity ri. Operation symbols of arity 0 are called constants. Assume a
countable set Vars of variables. Define the term algebra TΣ as the least set such that Vars ⊆ TΣ,
and for all f ∈ Σ of arity n, and for all t1, . . . , tn ∈ TΣ, then f(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ TΣ. Intuitively, TΣ
contains all the terms that can be built from the variables, constants, and operations in Σ. We say
a term is a ground term if it contains no variables. Let T gΣ be the set of ground terms in TΣ. A
ground substitution ρ is a mapping from variables in Vars to ground terms. The application of a
ground substitution ρ to a term t, written ρ(t), essentially consists of replacing every variable in t
with the ground term corresponding to t in ρ. Clearly, the application of a ground substitution to a
term yields a ground term.
A Σ-deductive system D is a subset of ℘fin(TΣ)× TΣ. (We write ℘(X) for the set of subsets of
X, and ℘fin(X) for the set of finite subsets of X.) We often omit the signature Σ when it is clear
from context. A deduction rule ({t1, . . . , tn}, t) of D is typically written t1, . . . , tn ⊲ t, and means
that t can be immediately deduced from t1, . . . , tn. A deduction of t from a set Γ of terms is a
sequence of ground terms t1, . . . , tn such that tn = t, and every ti is either
(1) a term ρ(t′), for some ground substitution ρ and some term t′ ∈ Γ;
(2) a term ρ(t′), for some ground substitution ρ and some term t′ for which there is a deduction
rule t′i1 , . . . , t
′
ik
⊲ t′ in D such that ρ(t′ij ) = tij for all j, and i1, . . . , ij < i.
We write Γ ⊢D t if there is a deduction from Γ to t via deduction rules in D. By definition, we have
t ⊢D t for all terms t.2
We will mainly be concerned with deductive systems that are decidable, that is, for which the
problem of deciding whether a deduction of t from Γ exists is decidable, for a term t and a finite set
2Our use of variables in deductive systems is purely for convenience. We could replace every deduction rule with
the rules obtained by substituting ground terms for all the variables, and get a deductive system that can derive the same
terms as the original one.
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of terms Γ. Moreover, it should be clear from the definitions that deductive systems are monotonic.
In other words, if Γ ⊢D t, then Γ′ ⊢D t when Γ ⊆ Γ′. Finally, observe that we do not impose
any restriction on the formation of terms. The whole theory we develop in this paper could take as
a starting point the notion of sorted term algebras [Higgins 1963], with little change; this would
allow restrictions on terms to be imposed in a natural way.
Example 2.1. We give a deductive system that captures the capabilities of the Dolev-Yao adversary
described in the introduction. Define the following Σ-deductive system DY, with signature Σ =
(recv, has, encr, conc, inv), where recv(m) represents the fact that the adversary has received the
term m, has(m) represents the fact that the adversary possesses the term m (i.e., is able to extract
message m from the messages he has received), encr(m,k) represents the encryption of term m
with key k, conc(m1,m2) represents the concatenation of terms m1 and m2, and inv(k) represents
the inverse of the key k:
recv(m) ⊲ has(m)
has(inv(k)), has(encr(m,k)) ⊲ has(m)
has(conc(m1,m2)) ⊲ has(m1)
has(conc(m1,m2)) ⊲ has(m2).
Assume further that Σ contains constants such as m, k1, k2. We can derive:
recv(encr(m, k1)), recv(encr(inv(k1), k2)), recv(inv(k2)) ⊢DY has(m).
In other words, it is possible for a Dolev-Yao adversary to derive the message m if he has received
m encrypted under a key k1, the inverse of which he has received encrypted under a key k2, whose
inverse he has received.
To account for constructing new messages, consider the signature Σ′ that extends Σwith a unary
constructor constr, where constr(m) represents the fact that the adversary can construct the term
m. We can account for this new constructor by adding the following deduction rules to DY:
has(m) ⊲ constr(m)
constr(k), constr(m) ⊲ constr(encr(m,k))
constr(m1), constr(m2) ⊲ constr(conc(m1,m2)).
For instance, we have
recv(encr(m, k1)), recv(inv(k1)), recv(k2) ⊢DY constr(encr(m, k2)).
⊓⊔
In what sense can we use deductive systems to model explicit knowledge? Intuitively, the ele-
ments of the term algebra represent facts, and the deduction rules of the system model the inferenc-
ing capabilities of the agent—which facts can he deduce from other facts. This gloss raises another
question, namely what to take as basic facts known to the agent without deduction, from which to
initially start deriving other facts? Konolige [1986] calls these basic beliefs, and there are a number
of approaches that can be followed. One approach is to simply posit a set of basic facts initially
known to the agent (perhaps different basic facts are initially known at different states). This does
not completely solve the problem, as it still requires determining which facts are initially known at
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every state. We pursue a different approach here, consistent with many well-known descriptions in
the literature: we take the basic beliefs of an agent to be his observations. Intuitively, an observation
is a fact that the agent can readily determine by examining his local state. We distinguish observa-
tions from other facts by using a unary constructor ob in the signature of the deductive systems we
consider in subsequent sections.
3 Deductive Algorithmic Knowledge
We now introduce a propositional modal logic for reasoning about the implicit and explicit knowl-
edge of an agent, where the explicit knowledge is formalized as a deductive system. In this section,
we focus on a single agent. We extend to multiple agents in Section 6.
We define the logic LKD(Σ), over a signature Σ. We take primitive propositions to be ground
terms T gΣ over the signature Σ. We use p to range over T
g
Σ, to emphasize that they are primitive
propositions, and distinguish them from terms over the more general signatures described later. The
language of the logic is obtained by starting with primitive propositions in T gΣ and closing off under
negation, conjunction, the K operator, the X operator, and the Ob operator (applied to primitive
propositions only). Intuitively, Kϕ is read as “the agent implicitly knows ϕ”, Xϕ is read as “the
agent explicitly knows ϕ, according to his deductive system”, and Ob(p) is read as “the agent
observes p”. We define the usual abbreviations, ϕ ∨ ψ for ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ), and ϕ ⇒ ψ for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ.
We define true as an abbreviation for an arbitrary but fixed propositional tautology, and false as an
abbreviation for ¬true.
To interpret the deductive algorithmic knowledge of an agent, we provide the agent with a de-
ductive system in which to perform his deductions. As we discussed in last section, we want the
agent to reason about observations he makes about his state; furthermore, because we will want to
interpret formulas in LKD as terms over which the deductive system can reason (see the semantics of
Xϕ below), we consider deductive systems defined over the signature Σ extended with a set ΣKD of
constructors corresponding to the operators in our logic, that is, ΣKD = {ob, true, false, not, and, know, xknow},
where true, false have arity 0, ob, not, know, xknow have arity 1, and and has arity 2.
The semantics of the logic follows the standard possible-worlds presentation for modal logics of
knowledge [Hintikka 1962]. A deductive algorithmic knowledge structure is a tuple M = (S, π,D),
where S is a set of states, π is an interpretation for the primitive propositions, and D is a Σ∪ΣKD-
deductive system. Every state s in S is of the form (e,O), where e captures the general state of
the system, and O is a finite set of observations. Each observation in O is a primitive proposition,
representing the observations that the agent has made at that state.3 The details of the states are es-
sentially irrelevant, as they are only used as a way to interpret the truth of the primitive propositions.
We do not model how agent makes observations, or temporal relationships between states. A state
simply represents a snapshot of the system under consideration. The interpretation π associates
with every state the set of primitive propositions that are true at that state, so that for every primitive
proposition p ∈ T gΣ, we have π(s)(p) ∈ {true, false}.
3For simplicity, we assume that the observations form a set. This implies that repetition of observations and their order
is unimportant. We can easily model the case where the observations form a sequence, at the cost of complicating the
presentation. We also assume, again for simplicity, that there are only finitely many observations at every state. Allowing
infinitely many observations does not affect anything in this section; we conjecture that the results in subsequent sections
also hold when infinitely many observations per state are allowed.
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We make a distinction between a fact, represented by a primitive proposition p, and an obser-
vation of that fact, represented by the formula Ob(p). For instance, the fact that Alice holds an
apple might be represented by the primitive proposition holds(alice, apple), which can be true or
not at a state, while the fact that the agent has observed that Alice is holding an apple is represented
by the formula Ob(holds(alice, apple)), which is true if and only if that observation is in the state
of the agent. It is not necessarily the case that if Ob(p) holds at a state then p holds at that state.
We therefore consider it possible that the agent makes unreliable observations. We can of course
assume that observations are reliable by imposing a restriction on the interpretation π, by taking
π((e,O))(p) = true whenever p ∈ O. More generally, we can impose restrictions on the models
considered, such as observations being restricted to a specific subset of the primitive propositions,
and so on.4
Example 3.1. Models are representations of situations we want to analyze, for instance, by verify-
ing that a situation satisfies a certain property. Suppose we wanted to specify the knowledge of a
Dolev-Yao adversary, as mentioned in the introduction, in the context where there are principals ex-
changing messages according to a protocol. The deductive system used by the adversary is a slight
extension of the deductive system DY from Example 2.1, extended to deal with observations. The
security literature generally assumes a subterm relation on the messages exchanged by the protocol;
define ⊑ on T g
DY
as the smallest relation satisfying
t ⊑ t
if t ⊑ t1 then t ⊑ conc(t1, t2)
if t ⊑ t2 then t ⊑ conc(t1, t2)
if t ⊑ t1 then t ⊑ encr(t1, t2).
(See Abadi and Rogaway [2000] for motivations.) Consider a structure M = (S, π,DY′), where
we record at every state all messages intercepted by the adversary at that state. We restrict the
observations at a state to be of the form recv(t), for ground terms t in which has does not occur.
The deductive system DY′ is just DY extended with a rule making observations available to the
deductive system:
ob(recv(t)) ⊲ recv(t).
The interpretation π is defined so that π((e,O))(has(t)) = true if and only if there exists a term
t′ ∈ T gDY such that recv(t′) ∈ O and t ⊑ t′. In other words, has(t) holds at a state if t is a subterm
of a message intercepted by the adversary. For instance, we can have s1 be a state with observations
{recv(encr(m, k1)), recv(encr(inv(k1), k2))},
and s2 a state with observations
{recv(encr(m, k1)), recv(encr(inv(k1), k2)), recv(inv(k2))}.
These states represent states where the adversary has intercepted particular messages. We shall see
how to specify properties of M , such as the fact the adversary does not explicitly know at s1 that he
possesses m, despite π(s1)(has(m)) = true. ⊓⊔
4We can also impose restrictions on deductive systems and signatures. In a preliminary version of this paper [Pucella
2004], for instance, we distinguished the notion of a primitive signature, which does not provide constructors for the
propositional and modal connectives. A deductive system based on a primitive signature only permits reasoning about
explicit knowledge of primitive propositions.
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LetM(Σ) be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using Σ∪ΣKD-deductive
systems. For a fixed Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D, let MD(Σ) be the set of all deductive algorith-
mic knowledge structures using deductive system D.
We define what it means for a formula ϕ to be true at a state s of M , written (M,s) |= ϕ,
inductively as follows. For the propositional fragment of the logic, the rules are straightforward.
(M,s) |= p if π(s)(p) = true
(M,s) |= ¬ϕ if (M,s) 6|= ϕ
(M,s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ if (M,s) |= ϕ and (M,s) |= ψ.
To define the semantics of knowledge, we follow the standard approach due to Hintikka [1962].
We define a relation on the states that captures the states that the agent cannot distinguish based on
the observations. Let s ∼ s′ if and only if s = (e,O) and s′ = (e′, O) for some e, e′, and set of
observations O. Clearly, ∼ is an equivalence relation on the states.
(M,s) |= Kϕ if (M,s′) |= ϕ for all s′ ∼ s.
To define the semantics of the X operator, we need to invoke the deductive system. To do this,
we first define the translation of a formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) into a term ϕT of the term algebra, in the
completely obvious way: pT is p for any primitive proposition p (recall that primitive propositions
are just terms in T gΣ), (¬ϕ)T is not(ϕT ), (ϕ ∧ ψ)T is and(ϕT , ψT ), (Kϕ)T is know(ϕT ), (Xϕ)T
is xknow(ϕT ), and (Ob(p))T is simply ob(p).
(M,s) |= Xϕ if s = (e,O) and {ob(p) | p ∈ O} ⊢D ϕT .
The monotonicity of the deductive systems means that for a structure M with states s = (e,O),
s′ = (e′, O′), and O ⊆ O′, we have (M,s) |= Xϕ implies (M,s′) |= Xϕ. Thus, explicit
knowledge of facts is never lost when new observations are made. Finally, we interpret Ob(p) by
checking whether p is one of the observations made by the agent:
(M,s) |= Ob(p) if s = (e,O) and p ∈ O.
As usual, we say a formula ϕ is valid in M if (M,s) |= ϕ for all s ∈ S, and satisfiable in M if
(M,s) |= ϕ for some s ∈ S. If M is a set of models, we say a formula ϕ is valid inM if ϕ is valid
in every M ∈ M, and satisfiable inM if ϕ is satisfiable in some M ∈ M. A formula ϕ in LKD(Σ)
is valid if it is valid in M(Σ), and satisfiable if it is satisfiable in M(Σ).
Example 3.2. Consider Example 3.1. By definition of π, (M,s1) |= K(has(m)) and (M,s2) |=
K(has(m)), so that at both states, the adversary implicitly knows he possesses message m. How-
ever, from the results of Example 2.1, we see that (M,s2) |= X(has(m)), while (M,s1) |=
¬X(has(m)). In other words, the adversary explicitly knows he possesses m at state s2 (where
he has intercepted the appropriate terms), but not at state s1. ⊓⊔
Example 3.3. The following deduction rules can be added to any deductive system to obtain a
deductive system that captures a subset of the inferences that can be performed in propositional
logic:
t ⊲ not(not(t)) not(and(t, not(t′))), t ⊲ t′ and(t, t′) ⊲ t′
not(not(t)) ⊲ t not(and(t, not(t′))), not(t′) ⊲ not(t) t, not(t) ⊲ false
t ⊲ not(and(not(t), not(t′))) t, t′ ⊲ and(t, t′) false ⊲ t
t′ ⊲ not(and(not(t), not(t′))) and(t, t′) ⊲ t.
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One advantage of these rules, despite the fact that they are incomplete, is that they can be used to
perform very efficient (linear-time, in fact) propositional inference [McAllester 1993]. ⊓⊔
Example 3.4. We can easily let the agent explicitly reason about his deductive algorithmic knowl-
edge by adding a rule
t ⊲ xknow(t) (1)
to his deductive system D. Thus, if M is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure over D, and
(M,s) |= Xϕ, then we have s = (e,O), with O ⊢D ϕT , and by the above rule, the deductive
system D can also derive O ⊢D xknow(ϕT ), so that O ⊢D (Xϕ)T . Thus, (M,s) |= X(Xϕ), as
required. It is possible to restrict the deductive algorithmic knowledge of an agent with respect to
his own deductive algorithmic knowledge by suitably modifying rule (1), restricting it to apply only
to a subset of the terms. ⊓⊔
There is a subtlety involved in any logic with a modal operator that we wish not to be subject
to logical omniscience. Intuitively, such a logic forces one to be quite aware of what symbols are
defined by abbreviation, and which are not. Earlier in this section, we defined true , false , ∨, and⇒
by abbreviation, which means that any formula containing ∨ or ⇒ is really a formula containing ∧
and ¬. Thus, the agent cannot explicitly distinguish between ϕ ∨ ψ and ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ); they are the
same formula in the logic, and the validity |= X(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ X(¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) simply reflects this
identity. Such a result seems to go against the main motivation for explicit knowledge, to ensure that
knowledge is not closed under tautologies. Part of the problem here is simply that defining operators
by abbreviation introduces inescapable equivalences. An easy way to circumvent this problem is to
use a syntax that directly uses ∨, ⇒, and perhaps other connectives, rather than introducing them
through abbreviations. We would then add similar constructors to the signature ΣKD, and extend
the translation ϕT accordingly. This gives full control on which tautologies are validated by explicit
knowledge, and which are not.
Finally, it is worth pointing out the relationship between our framework and Konolige’s [1986].
Roughly speaking, Konolige’s framework corresponds to the deductive systems we described in the
last section—it supplies a logical theory for the reasoning of an agent (albeit, in Konolige’s case,
a first-order logical theory). The logic in this section may be used to reason about the knowledge
of agents who reason using Konolige’s logical theories. In this sense, our logic is compatible with
Konolige’s framework. More interestingly, our framework semantically grounds the basic beliefs
assumed by Konolige’s framework: basic beliefs correspond to observations, which can be reasoned
about independently of the belief of the agents.
4 Axiomatizations
In this section, we present a sound and complete axiomatization for reasoning about explicit knowl-
edge given by a deductive system. Recall that a formula f is provable in an axiomatization if f can
be proved using the axioms and rules of inference of the axiomatization. An axiomatization is sound
with respect to a class M of structures if every formula provable in the axiomatization is valid in
M; an axiomatization is complete with respect toM if every formula valid in M is provable in the
axiomatization.
Clearly, for a fixed deductive system, the properties of X depend on that deductive system. In-
tuitively, we should be able to read off the properties of X from the deduction rules themselves.
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This is hardly surprising. Properties of the knowledge algorithms in the framework of algorith-
mic knowledge immediately translate to properties of the X operator. To adapt an example from
Halpern, Moses, and Vardi [1994], if a knowledge algorithm is sound, that is, it says the agent
explicitly knows ϕ in a state if and only if ϕ is true at that state, then Xϕ⇒ ϕ is valid in any struc-
ture using such a knowledge algorithm. What is interesting in the context of deductive algorithmic
knowledge is that we can completely characterize the properties of X by taking advantage of the
structure of the deductive systems. The remainder of this section makes this statement precise.
As a first step, we introduce an axiomatization for reasoning about deductive systems in gen-
eral, independently of the actual deduction rules of the system. This will form the basis of later
axiomatizations. First, we need axioms and inference rules capturing propositional reasoning in the
logic:
Taut. All instances of propositional tautologies.
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
Axiom Taut can be replaced by an axiomatization of propositional tautologies [Enderton 1972]. The
following well-known axioms and inference rules capture the properties of the knowledge operator
[Hintikka 1962]:
K1. (Kϕ ∧K(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kψ.
K2. From ϕ infer Kϕ.
K3. Kϕ⇒ ϕ.
K4. Kϕ⇒ KKϕ.
K5. ¬Kϕ⇒ K¬Kϕ.
We now turn to deductive algorithmic knowledge. Not surprisingly, Xϕ does not satisfy many
properties, because no assumptions were made about the deductive systems. Deductive algorithmic
knowledge is interpreted with respect to the observations at the current state, and two states are
indistinguishable to an agent if the same observations are made at both states; therefore, agents
know whether or not they explicitly know a fact. This is captured by the following axiom:
X1. Xϕ⇒ KXϕ.
In the presence of K1–K5, it is an easy exercise to check that ¬Xϕ⇒ K¬Xϕ is provable from X1.
In addition, all observations are explicitly known. This fact is expressed by the following axiom:
X2. Ob(p)⇒ XOb(p).
Axiom X2 just formalizes the following property of deduction as defined in Section 2: for all terms t
of a deductive system D, we have t ⊢D t. Finally, we need to capture the fact that indistinguishable
states have exactly the same observations:
X3. Ob(p)⇒ KOb(p).
It is easy to see that the formula ¬Ob(p) ⇒ K¬Ob(p) is provable from X3 in the presence of
K1–K5.
Let AX consist of the axioms Taut, MP, K1–K5, and X1–X3. Without further assumptions on
the deductive systems under consideration, AX completely characterizes reasoning about deductive
algorithmic knowledge.
10
Theorem 4.1. The axiomatization AX is sound and complete for LKD(Σ) with respect to M(Σ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
If we want to reason about deductive algorithmic knowledge structures equipped with a specific
deductive system, we can say more. We can essentially capture reasoning with respect to the specific
deductive system within our logic. The basic idea is to translate deduction rules of the deductive
system into formulas of LKD(Σ). A deduction rule of the form t1, . . . , tn ⊲ t in D is translated to
a formula (XtR1 ∧ . . . ∧ XtRn ) ⇒ XtR, with the understanding that an empty conjunction is just
true . We define the formula tR corresponding to the term t by induction on the structure of t:
trueR is true , falseR is false , (not(t))R is ¬(tR), (and(t1, t2))R is tR1 ∧ tR2 , (know(t))R is K(tR),
(xknow(t))R is X(tR), (ob(t))R is Ob(tR) (if t ∈ T gΣ), and tR is t for all other terms t. We view
the result of the translation as an axiom scheme, where the variables in t1, . . . , tn, t act as schema
metavariables, to be replaced by appropriate elements of the term algebra.5 It is easy to see that
(tT )R = t for all terms t. Furthermore, we do not translate constructors in ΣKD that appear under
constructors in Σ within a term. (Intuitively, these constructors will never arise out of the translation
of formulas given in Section 3.) Let AXD be the set of axioms derived in this way for the Σ∪ΣKD-
deductive system D.
A simple argument shows that the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AXD is not
complete for MD(Σ), since there are formulas of the form Xψ that cannot be true in any structure
inMD(Σ), namely, Xψ where ψT is not derivable from any set of observations using the deductive
system D. Thus, ¬Xψ is valid for those ψ, but the axioms above clearly cannot prove ¬Xψ. In
other words, the axioms in AXD capture deducibility in ⊢D, but not nondeducibility. We can
however establish completeness with respect to a more general class of structures, intuitively, those
structures using a deductive system containing at least the deduction rules in D. Let MD⊆(Σ) be
the class of all structures M such that there exists D′ with D ⊆ D′ and M ∈ MD′ .
Theorem 4.2. The axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AXD is sound and complete for
LKD(Σ) with respect to MD⊆(Σ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
If we are willing to restrict the formulas to consider, we can get completeness with respect to
MD(Σ). This follows directly from the intuition that the axiomatization can prove all deductions
in D but not the nondeductions. First, a few definitions: a top-level occurrence of a deductive
algorithmic knowledge subformula Xψ in ϕ is an occurrence that does not occur in the scope of an
X operator. An occurrence of a subformula ψ is said to be positive if it occurs in the scope of an
even number of negations.
Theorem 4.3. Let ϕ be a formula of LKD(Σ) in which every top-level occurrence of a subformula
Xψ is positive; then ϕ is valid in MD(Σ) if and only if ϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX
augmented with axioms AXD.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In particular, Theorem 4.3 implies that a formula of the form Xϕ is valid inMD(Σ) if and only
if Xϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AXD.
5One needs to be careful when defining this kind of axiom schema formally. Intuitively, an axiom schema of the
above form, with metavariables appearing in terms, corresponds to the set of axioms where each primitive proposition in
the axiom is a ground substitution instance of the appropriate term in the axiom schema.
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5 Decision Procedures
In this section, we study the decision problem for LKD(Σ), that is, the problem of determining,
for a given formula, whether it is satisfiable. Again, we emphasize that we are considering only a
single agent here; allowing multiple agents changes the complexity, as we shall see in Section 6.
Since LKD(Σ) logic extends the logic of knowledge where the knowledge operator is interpreted
over an equivalence relation (in our case, the relation ∼ saying that two states contain the same ob-
servations), and since the complexity of the decision problem for the latter is NP-complete [Ladner
1977], the difficulty of deciding satisfiability for LKD(Σ) is at least as hard. We can use the fact that
there is a tight relationship between these logics to get our complexity results.
We measure complexity in terms of the size of the formulas. Define the size |t| of a term t to
be the number of symbols required to write t, where each operation symbol is counted as a single
symbol. If Γ is a finite set of terms, then |Γ| is just the sum of the sizes of the terms in Γ. Similarly,
the size |ϕ| of a formula is defined to be the number of symbols required to write ϕ, where again
each operation symbol is counted as a single symbol.
We can now state our complexity results. It turns out that adding a deductive algorithmic knowl-
edge operator to the logic of knowledge over an equivalence relation does not change the complexity
of the decision problem. Deciding satisfiability of a formula of LKD(Σ) is essentially the same as
deciding satisfiability of a formula in the logic of knowledge over an equivalence relation, with the
difference that to account for deductive algorithmic knowledge, we need to construct a deductive
system with specific deduction rules that suffice to satisfy the subformulas Xϕ appearing in the
formula.
Theorem 5.1. The problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in M(Σ) is
NP-complete.
Proof. See Appendix B.
What happens if we fix a specific deductive system, and want to establish whether a formula
ϕ is satisfiable in a structure over that deductive system? The difficulty of this problem depends
intrinsically on the difficulty of deciding whether a deduction Γ ⊢D t exists in D. Since this
problem may be arbitrarily difficult for certain deductive systems D, reasoning in our logic can
be arbitrarily difficult over those deductive systems. The logic LKD(Σ) includes the propositional
connectives, which gives us an easy lower bound.
Theorem 5.2. For any given Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D, the problem of deciding whether a
formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in MD(Σ) is NP-hard.
Proof. See Appendix B.
On the other hand, if the deductive system is decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time
(i.e., if the problem of deciding whether a deduction Γ ⊢D t exists in D can be solved by a non-
deterministic Turing machine in time polynomial in |Γ| and |t|), then the decision problem for LKD
remains relatively easy, at least with respect to models of a reasonable size. More precisely, let
MnD(Σ) be the class of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using deductive system D,
where the number of observations at every state is at most n.
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Theorem 5.3. For any given Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D that is decidable in nondeterministic
polynomial time and for any polynomial P (x), the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of
LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in MP (|ϕ|)D (Σ) is NP-complete.
Proof. See Appendix B.
There is a class of deductive systems that can be efficiently decided (i.e., in polynomial time)
and thus by Theorem 5.3 lead to a reasonable complexity forLKD(Σ) interpreted over those systems.
Call a deduction local in a deductive system D if every proper subterm of a term in the deduction
is either a proper subterm of t, a proper subterm of a member of Γ, or appears as a subterm of a
deduction rule in D. For any deductive system D, whether a local deduction of t from Γ exists can
be decided in time polynomial in |Γ| and |t|. A deductive system D is local if whenever Γ ⊢D t there
exists a local deduction of t from Γ [McAllester 1993]. Thus, if D is a local deductive system, the
existence of a deduction ensures the existence of a local deduction, and consequently the deduction
relation ⊢D is polynomial-time decidable. The deductive system in Example 2.1 is local, while
adding the deduction rules in Example 3.3 to any local deductive system yields a local deductive
system.
Theorem 5.4. For any local Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D and for any polynomial P (x), the prob-
lem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in MP (|ϕ|)D (Σ) is NP-complete.
Proof. Immediate from the property of local deductive system, and from Theorem 5.3.
6 Reasoning about Multiple Agents
The framework we have described extends to multiple agents in a straightforward way. This exten-
sion is similar to the extension of modal logics of knowledge to multiple agents [Fagin, Halpern,
Moses, and Vardi 1995]. The only addition is that we need to equip every agent with a deductive
system.
Suppose a group of agents, named 1, . . . , n for simplicity. We define the logic LKDn (Σ) as we
did LKD(Σ), except that the operators Ki, Xi, and Obi are indexed by an agent. A priori, there
is no difficulty in giving a semantics to this logic as we have done in Section 3. Unfortunately,
this does not let an agent explicitly reason about another agent’s knowledge. In order to do this,
we need to modify and extend the framework. As before, we consider deductive systems over
a signature Σ extended with a set ΣKDn of constructors given by ΣKDn = {true, false, not, and} ∪⋃n
i=1{obi, knowi, xknowi}, where true, false have arity 0, obi, not, knowi, xknowi have arity 1, and
and has arity 2.
A deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n agents is a tuple M = (S, π,D1, . . . ,Dn),
where S is a set of states, π is an interpretation for the primitive propositions, and Di is a Σ∪ΣKDn -
deductive system. Every state s in S is of the form (e,O1, . . . , On), where e captures the general
state of the system, and Oi is a finite set of observations from T gΣ, representing the observations that
agent i has made at that state. The interpretation π associates with every state the set of primitive
propositions true at that state, so that for all primitive proposition p ∈ T gΣ, we have π(s)(p) ∈
{true, false}.
LetMn(Σ) be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures using Σ∪ΣKDn -deductive
systems for each agent. For fixed Σ∪ΣKDn -deductive systems D1, . . . ,Dn, let MD1,...,Dn(Σ)
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be the set of all deductive algorithmic knowledge structures for n agents with deductive systems
D1, . . . ,Dn (i.e., agent i uses deductive system Di).
The remaining definitions generalize in a similar way. We define, for each agent, a relation on
the states that captures the states that the agent cannot distinguish, based on his observations. More
precisely, let s ∼i s′ if and only s = (e,O1, . . . , On) and s′ = (e′, O′1, . . . , O′n), for some e, e′ and
sets of observations O1, . . . , On, O′1, . . . , O′n with Oi = O′i. Again, ∼i is an equivalence relation
on the states.
The translation of a formula ϕ into a term ϕT of the deductive system now takes into account
the name of the agents. As expected, pT is p for any primitive proposition p, (¬ϕ)T is not(ϕT ),
(ϕ∧ψ)T is and(ϕT , ψT ), (Kiϕ)T is knowi(ϕT ), (Xiϕ)T is xknowi(ϕT ), and (Obi(p))T is obi(p).
The semantics is just like that of Section 3, except with the following rules for Kiϕ, Xiϕ, and
Obi(p):
(M,s) |= Kiϕ if (M,s′) |= ϕ for all s′ ∼i s
(M,s) |= Xiϕ if s = (e,O1, . . . , On) and {obi(p) | p ∈ Oi} ⊢Di ϕT
(M,s) |= Obi(p) if s = (e,O1, . . . , On) and p ∈ Oi.
Example 6.1. Kaplan and Schubert [2000] study a phenomenon they call simulative inference
where, roughly speaking, an agent can reconstruct the reasoning of another agent. We can cap-
ture this phenomenon by making suitable assumptions on an agent’s deductive system. (Kaplan
and Schubert work in a different setting—they assume that the inference engine is explicitly told
formulas, and thus work in a setting similar to that of belief revision [Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and
Makinson 1985].) Say that a deductive system Di for agent i permits simulative inference of agent
j with Dj if Di contains a rule obj(t)⊲xknowj(obj(t)), and for every rule t1, . . . , tk ⊲t of Dj , there
is a corresponding rule xknowj(t1), . . . , xknowj(tk) ⊲ xknowj(t) in Di. It is then easy to check
that if we have (M,s) |= Xjϕ for some state s = (e,O1, . . . , On) with {p1, . . . , pk} ⊆ Oj , and
(M,s) |= XiObj(p1)∧· · ·∧XiObj(pk), then (M,s) |= XiXjϕ. Note that this derivation assumes
that the agent i can explicitly determine that agent j has observed p1, . . . , pk. ⊓⊔
As far as axiomatizations are concerned, we can essentially lift the results of Section 4. It suf-
fices to consider an axiomatization where K1–K5 now refer to Ki rather than just K . For instance,
K1 becomes Kiϕ ∧Ki(ϕ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ Kiψ, for every agent i. In a similar way, the axiom X1 simply
becomes Xiϕ ⇒ KiXiϕ. For X2 and X3, we need to further restrict the observations to be those
of the agent under consideration: Obi(p)⇒ XiObi(p), and Obi(p)⇒ KiObi(p). Let AXn be the
resulting axiomatization.
Theorem 6.2. The axiomatization AXn is sound and complete for LKDn (Σ) with respect toMn(Σ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
As in the single agent case, we can capture the reasoning with respect to specific deductive
systems (one per agent) within our logic. Again, we translate deduction rules of the deductive
systems into formulas of LKDn (Σ). Consider the deductive system Di for agent i. A deduction
rule of the form t1, . . . , tn ⊲ t in Di is translated to a formula (XitR1 ∧ . . . ∧ XitRn ) ⇒ XitR. We
define the formula tR corresponding to the term t by induction on the structure of t: trueR is true ,
falseR is false , (not(t))R is ¬(tR), (and(t1, t2))R is tR1 ∧ tR2 , (knowi(t))R is Ki(tR), (xknowi(t))R
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is Xi(tR), (obi(t))R is Obi(tR) (if t ∈ T gΣ), and tR is t for all other terms t. (As in Section 4,
such a translation yields an axiom schema, where we view the variables in t1, . . . , tn, t as schema
metavariables, to be replaced by appropriate elements of the term algebra.) Let AXDin be the set of
axioms derived in this way for the deductive system Di of agent i.
As in the single agent case, we cannot capture exactly the reasoning in structures where agent i
is using deductive system Di, since we cannot capture nondeducibility within the logic. Therefore,
completeness is established with respect to a larger class of structures. Let MD1,...,Dn⊆(Σ) be the
class of all structures M such that there exists D′1, . . . ,D′n with D1 ⊆ D′1, . . . ,Dn ⊆ D′n and
M ∈ MD′
1
,...,D′n
.
Theorem 6.3. The axiomatization AXn augmented with axioms AXD1n , . . . ,AXDnn is sound and
complete for LKDn (Σ) with respect to MD1,...,Dn⊆(Σ).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The complexity of the decision problem in the case of multiple agents reflects the complexity
of the decision problem for the modal logic of knowledge with multiple agents. The logic LKDn (Σ)
extends the logic of knowledge over equivalence relations for n agents, and it is known that the
decision problem for that logic is PSPACE-complete [Halpern and Moses 1992]. As in the single
agent case, adding deductive algorithmic knowledge does not affect the complexity of the decision
problem with respect to arbitrary deductive systems.
Theorem 6.4. If n ≥ 2, the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of LKDn (Σ) is satisfiable in
Mn(Σ) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. See Appendix C.
There is no clear candidate for an equivalent of Theorem 5.3 in the multiple agents context.
Assuming every agent uses a tractable deductive system yields an easy EXPTIME upper bound on
the decision problem for LKDn (Σ), while the best lower bound we obtain is the same as the one in
Theorem 6.4, that is, the problem is PSPACE-hard.
7 Conclusion
We have described in this paper an approach to combining implicit knowledge interpreted over pos-
sible worlds with a notion of explicit knowledge based on a deductive system that allows agents
to derive what they explicitly know. This additional structure, the agent’s deductive system, can be
used to completely characterize the properties of the explicit knowledge operator. More specifically,
we can derive sound and complete axiomatizations for the logic in a uniform way. There are many
approaches to modeling explicit knowledge in the literature, with many different philosophical in-
tuitions and interpretations. The model in this paper is based on a conception of explicit knowledge
(viz., obtained from inference rules) that goes back at least to Konolige [1986], and aims at cap-
turing a particularly computational interpretation of explicit knowledge based on observations. We
remark that our model is consistent with a number of epistemological theories [Pollock and Cruz
1999] that argue that all knowledge is ultimately derived from observations.
While the framework extends to multiple agents in a straightforward way, there are many issues
that still remain to be addressed at that level. For instance, a natural question is what happens when
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we move to more dynamic models, where the observations are taken over time. There are interesting
issues that arise, especially when we assume that agents do not share a clock to synchronize their
observations. We hope to explore this extension in future work.
What is our framework good for? Because deductive algorithmic knowledge is a special case
of algorithmic knowledge, any situation that can be modeled in our framework can also be modeled
in the original algorithmic knowledge framework. The one advantage of our logic, however, is
that it admits sound and complete axiomatizations derivable directly from the deductive systems.
Therefore, we can devise useful proof systems for interesting classes of applications, corresponding
to different deductive systems.
The framework in this paper sheds light on the epistemic content of deductive systems, in that we
provide a logic in which we can reason about implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge derived
from a deductive system. An interesting question is whether this approach can shed light on the
epistemic content of probabilistic deductive systems, of the kind found in the recent probabilistic
deductive database literature [Lukasiewicz 1999; Lakshmanan and Sadri 2001]. Presumably, the
ideas developed by Halpern and Pucella [2005] may be applicable in this setting.
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A Proofs for Section 4
The proof of soundness and completeness in Section 4 rely on fairly standard canonical model
constructions [Hughes and Cresswell 1996]. We review the required notions here, for completeness.
A canonical model is a model whose states are consistent sets of formulas, with the property that
valid formulas of the logic are true at states of the canonical model. Recall that a formula ϕ is
consistent (with respect to an axiomatization AX) if ¬ϕ is not provable from AX. A finite set of
formulas {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} is consistent if and only if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn is consistent. An infinite set F
of formulas is consistent if and only if every finite subset of F is consistent. A set of formulas
is maximally consistent if it is not properly contained in any other consistent set of formulas. We
assume some familiarity with properties of maximally consistent sets of formulas. Such properties
include, for V a maximally consistent set of formulas: for all ϕ, exactly one of ϕ or ¬ϕ is in V ; ϕ
and ψ are both in V if and only if ϕ ∧ ψ is in V ; if ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ are in V , then ψ is in V ; every
provable formula is in V (in particular, every axiom of AX is in V ).
Some definitions will be useful. First, given a set V of formulas, let V/K = {ϕ | Kϕ ∈ V }.
Let C be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas of LKD(Σ). For V ∈ C, let V/Ob = {p ∈
T gΣ | Ob(p) ∈ V }. Define the relation ≈ over C by taking V ≈ U if and only if V/K ⊆ U .
Lemma A.1. (1) ≈ is an equivalence relation on C.
(2) If V ≈ U , then V/Ob = U/Ob.
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(3) For all ψ in LKD(Σ), if V ≈ U , then Xψ ∈ V if and only if Xψ ∈ U .
Proof. (1) The proof that ≈ is an equivalence relation is completely standard, and relies on the
axioms K1–K5 [Hughes and Cresswell 1996].
(2) Let p ∈ V/Ob ⊆ V . Since V is maximally consistent, all instances of X3 are in V , and thus
Ob(p) ⇒ KOb(p) is in V , so by MP, KOb(p) ∈ V , and thus Ob(p) ∈ V/K ⊆ U . Therefore,
Ob(p) ∈ U , and V/Ob ⊆ U/Ob. Since ≈ is an equivalence relation, V ≈ U implies that U ≈ V ,
and by the same argument, we get U/Ob ⊆ V/Ob.
(3) This follows easily from X1. Assume Xψ ∈ V . Then KXψ ∈ V by X1, and thus Xψ ∈
V/K , and since V ≈ U ,Xψ ∈ U . The converse direction follows from the fact that≈ is symmetric.
Theorem 4.1. The axiomatization AX is sound and complete for LKD(Σ) with respect to M(Σ).
Proof. Proving soundness is straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement
that if ϕ is consistent (i.e., ¬ϕ is not provable from the axiomatization AX), then ϕ is satisfiable
in some structure in M(Σ). The satisfying structure will be constructed from the set of maximally
consistent formulas.
Let ϕ be a consistent formula of LKD(Σ), and let Sub(ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ (in-
cluding ϕ itself). Since ϕ is consistent, there is a set V ϕ ∈ C with ϕ ∈ V ϕ with |V ϕ/Ob| < ∞:
first construct a set V starting with ϕ, adding Ob(p) for every observation Ob(p) appearing in ϕ if
Ob(p) ∧ ϕ is consistent, and adding ¬Ob(p) for every observation Ob(p) either not appearing in ϕ
or inconsistent with ϕ; it easy to establish that V is consistent, so V is extensible to a maximally
consistent set V ϕ with |V ϕ/Ob| <∞.
Let Oϕ = V ϕ/Ob. Let [V ϕ]≈ be the ≈-equivalence class that contains V ϕ. We will use the
sets of formulas [V ϕ]≈ as states of our structure. More specifically, define the deductive algorithmic
knowledge structure Mϕ = (Sϕ, πϕ,Dϕ) by taking:
Sϕ = {(sV , O
ϕ) | V ∈ [V ϕ]≈}
πϕ((sV , O
ϕ))(p) =
{
true if p ∈ V
false if p 6∈ V
Dϕ = {(∅, ψT ) | Xψ ∈ Sub(ϕ),Xψ ∈ V ϕ}.
To simplify the discussion, and because Oϕ is fixed in Mϕ, we refer to the state (sV , Oϕ) as simply
sV ; for instance, we freely write sV ∈ Sϕ. We can check that Dϕ defines a Σ∪ΣKD-deductive
system. Decidability of Dϕ holds trivially, since Dϕ contains finitely many deduction rules, as
Sub(ϕ) is finite. Thus, Mϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure.
We now show that for all sV ∈ Sϕ and all subformulas ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), we have (Mϕ, sV ) |= ψ
if and only if ψ ∈ V , by induction on the structure of formulas. The cases for true, false , primitive
propositions, conjunction, and negation are straightforward, using maximal consistency of V .
For Ob(p), first assume that (Mϕ, sV ) |= Ob(p). This means that p ∈ Oϕ, so p ∈ V ϕ/Ob,
and since V ϕ/Ob = V/Ob, p ∈ V/Ob, and thus Ob(p) ∈ V . Conversely, if Ob(p) ∈ V , then
p ∈ V/Ob = V ϕ/Ob, so that p ∈ Oϕ, and thus (Mϕ, sV ) |= Ob(p).
Now, consider a deductive algorithmic knowledge formula Xψ. First, assume that we have
(Mϕ, sV ) |= Xψ. By definition, {ob(p) | p ∈ Oϕ} ⊢Dϕ ψT . If ψ is Ob(p) for some p ∈ Oϕ,
then (Mϕ, sV ) |= Ob(p), and thus Ob(p) ∈ V by the induction hypothesis; by X2, XOb(p) ∈ V .
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Otherwise, by construction of Dϕ, there must exist a rule ⊲ψT in Dϕ. In other words, Xψ ∈ V ϕ.
Since V ≈ V ϕ by choice of Sϕ, we get Xψ ∈ V , following Lemma A.1. Conversely, assume that
Xψ ∈ V . By definition of Dϕ, (∅, ψT ) ∈ Dϕ, and thus {ob(p) | p ∈ Oϕ} ⊢Dϕ ψT , meaning that
(Mϕ, sV ) |= Xψ.
For a knowledge formula Kψ, the result follows from essentially the same proof as that of
Halpern and Moses [1992]. We give it here for completeness. First, assume (Mϕ, sV ) |= Kψ. It
follows that (V/K) ∪ {¬ψ} is not consistent. (Otherwise, it would be contained in some maximal
consistent set U in C, and by construction, we would have V/K ⊆ U , and thus V ≈ U , and
hence sV ∼ sU ; but since we have ¬ψ ∈ U , we have ψ 6∈ U , and by the induction hypothesis,
(Mϕ, sU ) 6|= ψ, contradicting (Mϕ, sV ) |= Kψ.) Since (V/K) ∪ {¬ψ} is not consistent, there
must be some finite subset {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk,¬ψ} which is not consistent. By propositional reasoning,
we can derive that ϕ1 ⇒ (ϕ2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (ϕk ⇒ ψ) . . . )) is provable, and thus K(ϕ1 ⇒ (ϕ2 ⇒
(. . . ⇒ (ϕk ⇒ ψ) . . . ))) is provable by K2. It is straightforward to derive from this by induction,
propositional reasoning, and K1, that Kϕ1 ⇒ (Kϕ2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (Kϕk ⇒ Kψ) . . . )) is provable.
Thus, Kϕ1 ⇒ (Kϕ2 ⇒ (. . . ⇒ (Kϕk ⇒ Kψ) . . . )) ∈ V . Because ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ V/K , we
have Kϕ1, . . . ,Kϕk ∈ V , and by repeated applications of MP, we have Kψ ∈ V , as desired.
Conversely, if we assume Kψ ∈ V , then ψ ∈ V/K. Let sU be an arbitrary state of Sϕ. By
construction of Mϕ, V ≈ U and thus V/K ⊆ U . Therefore, we have ψ ∈ U , and by the induction
hypothesis, (Mϕ, sU ) |= ψ. Since sU was arbitrary, and since sU ∼ sV (immediate by the definition
of Sϕ), this means that (Mϕ, sV ) |= Kψ.
Completeness of AX now follows immediately. Since ϕ ∈ V ϕ and ϕ ∈ Sub(ϕ), we have
(Mϕ, sV ϕ) |= ϕ, and thus ϕ is satisfiable.
Theorem 4.2. The axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AXD is sound and complete for
LKD(Σ) with respect to MD⊆(Σ).
Proof. Soundness is again straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement
that if ϕ is consistent (i.e., if ¬ϕ is not provable from the axiomatization AX augmented with the
axioms AXD) then ϕ is satisfiable in some structure in MD(Σ). The procedure is exactly the one
that is used to prove Theorem 4.1, except with a different deductive system Dϕ.
We simply indicate where the proof differs from that of Theorem 4.1, and let the reader fill
in the details. We construct, for a given ϕ, a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure Mϕ =
(Sϕ, πϕ,Dϕ), where Sϕ and πϕ are constructed as in Theorem 4.1, and Dϕ is given by
D ∪ {(∅, ψT ) | Xψ ∈ Sub(ϕ),Xψ ∈ V ϕ}.
We can check that Mϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure in MD⊆(Σ). The deductive
system Dϕ has the following interesting property: if {ob(p) | p ∈ Oϕ} ⊢D ψT , then there is a
rule ⊲ψT in Dϕ. In other words, every term ψT derivable from the rules in D is derivable directly
with a single rule in Dϕ. Here is the proof of this property. Assume {ob(p) | p ∈ Oϕ} ⊢D ψT .
Clearly, it is sufficient to show that Xψ ∈ V ϕ. If ψ is Ob(p) for some p ∈ Oϕ, then Ob(p) ∈ V ϕ,
so by X2, XOb(p) ∈ V ϕ. Otherwise, there must exist a deduction t1, . . . , tm in D such that
tm = ψ
T is a conclusion of the deduction. We show by induction on the length of the deduction
that for every i, X(ti)R ∈ V ϕ. For the base case i = 1, we have two cases. If t1 is ob(t)
for some t ∈ Oϕ, then (t1)R = Ob(t), and XOb(t) ∈ V ϕ follows from X2 and the fact that
t ∈ Oϕ implies that Ob(t) ∈ V ϕ. If t1 follows from the application of a deduction rule in D,
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with no antecedents, then by construction, there is an instance of this rule in V ϕ, of the form
true ⇒ X(t1)
R
, and thus X(t1)R ∈ V ϕ. For the inductive case i > 1, again, there are two cases.
If ti is ob(t) for some t ∈ Oϕ, then the result X(t1)R follows as in the base case. Otherwise, there
is a rule t′1, . . . , t′k ⊲ t′ in D such that for some ground substitution ρ such that ρ(t′) = ti and for
all j ∈ 1..k, ρ(t′j) appears in the deduction before term ti. By construction, there is an instance of
X(t′1)
R ∧ · · · ∧ X(t′k)
R ⇒ X(t′)R in V ϕ, and by induction hypothesis, we have X(t′ij )
R ∈ V ϕ
for each ij < i. Thus, by MP, we have X(ti)R ∈ V ϕ. Since ψT = tm, the last element of the
deduction, we get that X(ψT )R = Xψ is in V ϕ, as desired.
The rest of the proof follows as before.
The following lemma is useful for proving Theorem 4.3. Roughly, it says that any formula can
be written as an equivalent formula where all instances of the negation operator occurs before a
primitive proposition, an observation formula, or an explicit knowledge formula. To simplify the
presentation of the lemma, we write the resulting formula using operator ∨, as well as operator Lϕ,
which is just an abbreviation for ¬K¬ϕ.
Lemma A.2. Every formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is logically equivalent to a formula ϕ written using p,
¬p, Ob(p), ¬Ob(p) (for primitive propositions p) and Xϕ and ¬Xϕ (for ϕ in LKD(Σ)), and the
operators ∧, ∨, K , and L. Moreover, if every top-level occurrence of a subformula Xψ is positive
in ϕ, then no occurrence of Xψ in ϕ is in the scope of a negation.
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows directly from the following laws, which permit one to
move negations into a formula as far down as they go:
¬(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇔ (¬ϕ) ∨ (¬ψ)
¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)⇔ (¬ϕ) ∧ (¬ψ)
¬(Kϕ)⇔ L(¬ϕ)
¬(¬ϕ)⇔ ϕ.
The second part of the lemma follows by observing that the laws above preserve the evenness or
oddness of the number of negations under the scope of which each subformula Xψ appears.
Theorem 4.3. Let ϕ be a formula of LKD(Σ) in which every top-level occurrence of a subformula
Xψ is positive; then ϕ is valid in MD(Σ) if and only if ϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX
augmented with axioms AXD.
Proof. Let ϕ be of the required form. By Lemma A.2, ϕ is also of the required form, and moreover
is such that negations only appear in front of p, Ob(p), or Xψ. Since each occurrence is Xψ in ϕ
is positive, this means that every Xψ appears unnegated in ϕ. Let M = (S, π,D) be an arbitrary
model in MD(Σ), and let MD′ = (S, π,D′) be the corresponding model for D′ ⊇ D. We claim
that for all s ∈ S, (M,s) |= ϕ if and only if (MD′ , s) |= ϕ. This is easily established by induction
on the structure of ϕ. (The key point is that we do not need to consider the case ¬Xψ, which is
guaranteed not to occur in ϕ.) Since s was arbitrary, we have M |= ϕ if and only if MD′ |= ϕ.
Now, assume ϕ is valid in MD(Σ). Let MD′ = (S, π,D′) be an arbitrary model in MD⊆(Σ), and
let M = (S, π,D). Since ϕ is valid in MD(Σ), M |= ϕ; by our result above, MD′ |= ϕ. Since
MD′ was arbitrary, we have ϕ is valid in MD⊆(Σ).
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Conversely, assume ϕ is provable in the axiomatization AX augmented with axioms AXD. By
Theorem 4.2, ϕ is valid in MD⊆(Σ). Since MD(Σ) ⊆ MD⊆(Σ), then ϕ is certainly valid in
MD.
B Proofs for Section 5
We assume the terminology and notation of [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995] for the modal
logic of knowledge over an arbitrary equivalence relation; we call this logic LK, and let f, g range
over formulas of LK. (This notation will let us distinguish LK formulas from LKD(Σ) formulas
when they occur in the same statements.) The logic LK is interpreted over LK-structures, that is,
Kripke structures (S,K, π) with an arbitrary equivalence relation K over the states that is used to
interpret the modal operator; the satisfaction relation is written (M,s) |=K f , and is defined just
like |=, but using the equivalence relation K over the states rather than the ∼ relation, and without
the X and Ob operators. We write K(s) for {s′ | (s, s′) ∈ K}. The following small model result
for LK, due to Ladner [1977], is central to most of the proofs in this section.
Theorem B.1. [Ladner 1977] Given f an LK formula, if f is satisfiable, then f is satisfiable in an
LK-structure M = (S,K, π) where |S| ≤ |f |, and K is the universal relation, that is, K = S × S.
Our result will follow by relating the complexity of LKD(Σ) to the complexity of LK. We
can easily reduce the decision problem for LK to our logic, by simply ignoring the Xϕ formulas.
Consider the following construction. Let f be a formula of LK. Let p1, . . . , pk be the primitive
propositions appearing in f . We first come up with an encoding of these primitive propositions
into the language of Σ. For example, we can take p1 to be true, p2 to be not(true), p3 to be
not(not(true)), and so forth. Let tp be the term encoding the primitive proposition p. Let fˆ be the
formula obtained by replacing every instance of a primitive proposition p in f by tp. Note that |fˆ |
is polynomial in |f |, and that fˆ contains no instance of the X operator.
Lemma B.2. Given f an LK formula, and given D an arbitrary KD deductive system over Σ, the
following are equivalent:
(1) f is satisfiable in an LK-structure;
(2) fˆ is satisfiable in MD(Σ);
(3) fˆ is satisfiable in M(Σ).
Proof. (1)⇒ (2): Assume f is satisfiable in an LK-structure. By Theorem B.1, we know that there
exists an LK-structure M = (S,K, π) where K is an equivalence relation on S and (M,s) |=K f
for some s ∈ S.6 Let {[s]K | s ∈ S} be the set of equivalence classes of K, of which there are
at most |f |. We encode these equivalence classes using an encoding similar to that for primitive
propositions. Let false, not(false), not(not(false)), . . . be an encoding of these equivalence classes,
where we denote by ts the encoding of [s]K. Thus, (s, s′) ∈ K if and only if ts = ts′ . Construct
the deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M ′ = (S′, π′,D), where S′ = {(s, {ts}) | s ∈ S},
6While Theorem B.1 says that the equivalence relation K can be taken to be universal, we will not take advantage of
this in this proof or the proof of Lemma B.3. This is in order to simplify the generalization of these proofs to the multiple
agents case (Theorem 6.4).
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and π′ is given as follows. For a term tp and state s, π′((s, {ts}))(tp) = π(s)(p). For all other
terms t, we take π′((s, {ts}))(t) = false. It is easy to check by induction on the structure of f
that if (M,s) |=K f , then (M ′, (s, {ts})) |= fˆ . Here are the interesting cases of the induction.
If f is a primitive proposition p, then by assumption, (M,s) |=K p, so π(s)(p) = true; thus,
π′((s, {ts}))(tp) = true, and (M ′, (s, {ts})) |= tp. If f isKg, then by assumption, (M,s) |=K Kg,
so that for all s′ ∈ K(s), (M,s′) |=K g. By the induction hypothesis, we have for all s′ ∈ K(s),
(M ′, (s′, {ts′})) |= gˆ, which is equivalent to saying that for all (s′, {ts′}) ∼ (s, {ts}) (since ts′ = ts
exactly when s′ ∈ K(s)), (M ′, (s′, {ts′})) |= gˆ, and thus (M ′, (s, {ts})) |= Kgˆ, as required.
(2)⇒ (3): This is immediate, since MD(Σ) ⊆M(Σ).
(3) ⇒ (1): Assume fˆ is satisfiable in a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M =
(S, π,D′), that is, (M,s) |= fˆ for some s ∈ S. Construct the LK-structure M ′ = (S,K, π′)
by taking π′(s)(p) = true if and only if π(s)(tp) = true, and taking K to be ∼. It is easy to check
by induction on the structure of f that if (M,s) |= fˆ , then (M ′, s) |=K f . Here are the interesting
cases of the induction. If f is a primitive proposition p, then by assumption, (M,s) |= tp, so that
π(s)(tp) = true. Thus means π′(s)(p) = true, and thus (M ′, s) |=K p. If f is Kg, then by assump-
tion, (M,s) |= Kgˆ, that is, for all s′ ∼ s, (M,s′) |= gˆ. By the induction hypothesis, this yields for
all s′ ∼ s, (M ′, s′) |=K g, which is equivalent to the fact that for all s′ ∈ K(s), (M ′, s′) |=K g, that
is, (M ′, s) |=K Kg, as required.
Lemma B.2 says that we can relate the satisfiability of an arbitrary formula of LK to that of a
formula of LKD. We can similarly relate the satisfiability of an arbitrary formula of LKD to that of
a formula of LK, in much the same way. More precisely, given ϕ ∈ LKD(Σ), let ϕ˜ be defined as
follows. The set T gΣ is countable, so let {pt | t ∈ T
g
Σ} be a countable set of primitive propositions
corresponding to the ground terms of TΣ. Similarly, the set of formulas {Xψ | ψ ∈ LKD(Σ)} is
countable, so let {qψ | ψ ∈ LKD(Σ)} be a countable set of primitive propositions where qψ corre-
sponds to the formula Xψ. Finally, let {rt | t ∈ T gΣ} be a countable set of primitive propositions
where rt corresponds to the formula Ob(t). Let ϕ˜ be the translation of ϕ obtained by replacing
every occurrence of a term t in T gΣ by pt, every occurrence of a formula Xψ by the corresponding
qψ, and every occurrence of a formula Ob(t) by the corresponding rt, in conjunction with formulas
rt ⇔ Krt for all observations Ob(t) appearing in ϕ, formulas qψ ⇔ Kqψ for all Xψ appearing in
ϕ, and formulas rt ⇒ qOb(t) for all observations Ob(t) appearing in ϕ. This translation is essen-
tially compositional: ϕ˜1 ∧ ϕ2 is logically equivalent to ϕ˜1 ∧ ϕ˜2, ¬˜ϕ is logically equivalent to ¬ϕ˜,
and K˜ϕ is logically equivalent to Kϕ˜. Note that |ϕ˜| is polynomial in |ϕ|.
Lemma B.3. If ϕ ∈ LKD(Σ), then ϕ is satisfiable in M(Σ) if and only if ϕ˜ is satisfiable in an
LK-structure.
Proof. Assume ϕ is satisfiable in M(Σ), that is, there is a deductive algorithmic knowledge struc-
ture M = (S, π,D) such that (M,s) |= ϕ for some s ∈ S. Construct an LK-structure M ′ =
(S,K, π′) by taking π′(s)(pt) = π(s)(t), π′(s)(qψ) = true if and only if (M,s) |= Xψ, ϕ′(s)(rt) =
true if and only if (M,s) |= Ob(t), and K is simply ∼. It is easy to check by induction on the
structure of ϕ that if (M,s) |= ϕ, then (M ′, s) |=K ϕ˜. Here are the interesting cases of the induc-
tion. If ϕ is a ground term t, then by assumption, (M,s) |= t, and π(s)(t) = true. This yields
π′(s)(pt) = true, and (M ′, s) |=K pt. If ϕ is Xψ, then by assumption, (M,s) |= Xψ, and there-
fore π′(s)(qψ) = true, so that (M ′, s) |=K qψ . If ϕ is Ob(p), then by assumption (M,s) |= Ob(p),
therefore π′(s)(rp) = true, so that (M ′, s) |=K rp. If ϕ is Kψ, then by assumption, (M,s) |= Kψ,
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that is, for all s′ ∼ s, (M,s′) |= ψ. By the induction hypothesis, and the definition of K, we have
for all s′ ∈ K(s), (M ′, s′) |=K ψ˜, that is, (M ′, s) |=K Kψ˜, as required.
Conversely, assume ϕ˜ is satisfied in some LK-structure. By Theorem B.1, we know that there
exists an LK-structure M = (S,K, π) where |S| ≤ |ϕ˜| and (M,s) |=K ϕ˜ for some s ∈ S. Let
{[s]K | s ∈ S} be the set of equivalence classes of K, of which there are at most |ϕ˜|, which is poly-
nomial in |ϕ|. Let t1, t2, . . . be an encoding of these equivalence classes using terms ti ∈ T gΣ such
that no Ob(ti) appears in ϕ. We denote by ts the term encoding the class [s]K. Thus, (s, s′) ∈ K if
and only if ts = ts′ . For every world s ∈ S, let O(s) = {p | π(s)(rp) = true,Ob(p) appears in ϕ}.
In some sense, O(s) represents the observations made at s. By the construction of ϕ˜, if (s, s′) ∈ K,
then O(s) = O(s′): assume t ∈ O(s); then (M,s) |= Ob(rt), and thus (M,s) |= KOb(rt)
(since (M,s) |= ϕ˜), so that (M,s′) |= Ob(rt), and t ∈ O(s′); the result follows by sym-
metry of K. Construct the deductive algorithmic knowledge structure M ′ = (S′, π′,D), where
S′ = {(s, {ts} ∪ O(s)) | s ∈ S}, and π′ is obtained by taking π′((s,O))(t) = true if and only
if π(s)(pt) = true. Finally, take D = {({ts}, ψT ) | π(s)(qψ) = true}. It is easy to check by
induction on the structure of ϕ that if (M,s) |=K ϕ˜, then (M ′, (s, {ts} ∪ O(s))) |= ϕ. Here are
the interesting cases of the induction. If ϕ is a term t, then by assumption, (M,s) |=K pt, so that
π(s)(pt) = true. Thus, we have π′((s, {ts} ∪ O(s)))(t) = true, and (M ′, (s, {ts} ∪ O(s))) |= t.
If ϕ is Xψ, then we have by assumption (M,s) |=K qψ, and so π(s)(qψ) = true, meaning that
({ts}, ψ
T ) is a deduction rule in D, and thus (M ′, (s, {ts} ∪ O(s))) |= Xψ. If ϕ is Ob(t),
then by assumption (M,s) |= rt, so that π(s)(rt) = true. Thus, t ∈ O(s), and therefore
(M ′, (s, {ts}∪O(s))) |= Ob(t). If ϕ is Kψ, consider an arbitrary s′ such that (s′, {ts′}∪O(s′)) ∼
(s, {ts}∪O(s)). This certainly implies, by the assumptions on the encoding, that ts = ts′ , and thus
s′ ∈ K(s). By the fact that (M,s) |= Kψ˜, we have (M,s′) |= ψ˜, and by the induction hypothesis,
(M ′, {ts′}∪O(s
′)) |= ψ. Since s′ was arbitrary, we get (M ′, {ts}∪O(s)) |= Kψ, as required.
Theorem 5.1. The problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in M(Σ) is
NP-complete.
Proof. For the lower bound, we show how to reduce from the decision problem of LK. Let f be a
formula of LK. By Lemma B.2, f is satisfiable if and only if fˆ is satisfiable in M(Σ). Thus, the
complexity of the decision problem for LK is a lower bound for our decidability problem, that is, NP.
For the upper bound, we need to exhibit a nondeterministic polynomial time algorithm that decides
if ϕ ∈ LKD(Σ) is satisfiable. We will use the decision problem for LK itself as an algorithm. By
Lemma B.3, ϕ is satisfiable if and only if ϕ˜ is satisfiable, so we can simply invoke the NP algorithm
for LK satisfiability on ϕ˜.
Theorem 5.2. For any given Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D, the problem of deciding whether a
formula ϕ of LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in MD(Σ) is NP-hard.
Proof. The lower bound follows from Lemma B.2. Let f be an LK formula; f is satisfiable if and
only if fˆ is satisfiable over MD(Σ) structures. Since the decision problem for LK is NP-complete,
the lower bound follows.
The following small model result for LKD(Σ) over MnD(Σ) is needed in the proof of Theo-
rem 5.3. Define the size |M | of a model M to be the sum of the sizes of the states, where the size
of a state (e, {p1, . . . , pk}) is 1 + |p1|+ · · · + |pk|.
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Lemma B.4. Let P (x) be a polynomial. If ϕ is satisfiable in M ∈ MP (|ϕ|)D (Σ), then ϕ is satisfiable
in a structure M ′ ∈ MP (|ϕ|)D (Σ) with |M ′| polynomial in |ϕ|.
Proof. Assume ϕ is satisfiable in some structure M . Let M1 = (S1,K1, π1) be the LK-structure
obtained by the construction in Lemma B.3, with (M1, s1) |=K ϕ˜, for some s1 = (e,O) in S1. By
Lemma B.1, we know that ϕ˜ is satisfied in an LK-structure M2 = (S2,K2, π2) where |S2| ≤ |ϕ˜|,
K2 is a universal relation on S2 (that is, K2 = S2 × S2), and (M2, s2) |=K ϕ˜ for some s2 ∈ S2. We
reconstruct a satisfying deductive algorithmic knowledge structure from M2. Specifically, define
M ′ = (S′, π′,D) by taking S′ = {(s,O) | s ∈ S2} (where O is the set of observations at state
s1), and π′((s,O))(t) = π2(s)(pt). Because the construction of Lemma B.3 does not change the
number of observations at a state and M ∈ MP (|ϕ|), we have |s1| ≤ P (|ϕ|), and thus
∑
p∈O|p| ≤
P (|ϕ|). Thus, |M ′| is polynomial in |S2|P (|ϕ|) ≤ |ϕ˜|P (|ϕ|), that is, polynomial in |ϕ|, as required.
A straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ shows that if (M,s) |= ϕ (or equivalently, by
Lemma B.3, (M1, s1) |=K ϕ˜ for some s1), then (M ′, (s2, O)) |= ϕ, for some s2. Here are the
interesting cases of the induction. If ϕ is a ground term t, then (M1, s1) |= pt, and π1(s1)(pt) =
true; this means that π2(s2)(pt) = true (by construction of M2), so that π′((s2, O))(t) = true,
and (M ′, (s2, O)) |= t. If ϕ is Xψ, then by the fact that (M,s) |= Xψ, and that s = (e,O), we
have {ob(p) | p ∈ O} ⊢D ψT , and thus, (M ′, (s2, O)) |= Xψ, since the same observations are
used at s2. Similarly, if ϕ is Ob(t), then (M,s) |= Ob(t), and if s = (e,O), then t ∈ O, and
thus (M ′, (s2, O)) |= Ob(t), since the same observations are used at s2. Finally, if ϕ is Kψ, then
consider an arbitrary s′ such that (s′, O) ∼ (s2, O); since all states have the same observations,
s′ can be arbitrary in S2. Since K2 was the universal relation on S2, we have s′ ∈ K2(s2). By
assumption, we know (M1, s1) |=K Kψ˜, and thus (M2, w2) |=K Kψ˜, so that (M2, s′) |=K ψ˜. By
the induction hypothesis, (M ′, (s′, O)) |= ψ, and since s′ was arbitrary, (M ′, (s2, O)) |= Kψ, as
required.
Theorem 5.3. For any given Σ∪ΣKD-deductive system D that is decidable in nondeterministic
polynomial time and for any polynomial P (x), the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of
LKD(Σ) is satisfiable in MP (|ϕ|)D (Σ) is NP-complete.
Proof. The lower bound is given by Theorem 5.2. For the upper bound, we can do something
similar to what we did in Theorem 5.1, except we need to keep track of the size of the objects
we manipulate. Let ϕ be a formula of LKD(Σ). We exhibit an algorithm that nondeterministically
decides if ϕ is satisfiable. From Lemma B.4, it suffices to nondeterministically guess a satisfying
structure M with a set of worlds polynomial in |ϕ|, which is guaranteed to exist if and only if ϕ is
satisfiable. Moreover, for every subformula Xψ of ϕ (of which there are polynomially many) and
every state s of M (of which there are polynomially many), we nondeterministically guess whether
the observations at s (of which there are polynomially many) can derive ψT . We can verify that ϕ
is satisfied in M in time polynomial in |ϕ|, by adapting the polynomial time algorithm of [Halpern
and Moses 1992, Proposition 3.1]. Roughly speaking, the algorithm consists of enumerating all the
subformulas of ϕ, and for each subformula ψ (in order of length), marking every state of M with
either ψ or ¬ψ depending on whether ψ or ¬ψ holds at the state: primitive propositions are handled
by invoking the interpretation, formulas of the form Xψ′ are handled by verifying if the guess of
whether ψ′T is derivable from the observations at the state is correct, formulas of the form Ob(p)
are handled by looking up p in the observations at the state (the number of which is polynomial in
23
|ϕ|), conjunctions and negations are handled in the obvious way, and formulas Kψ′ are handled by
looking up whether every reachable state from the current state is marked with ψ′.
C Proofs for Section 6
Theorem 6.2. The axiomatization AXn is sound and complete for LKDn (Σ) with respect toMn(Σ).
Proof. This is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.1. Soundness is easy to check. For
completeness, we again show that if ϕ is consistent, then ϕ is satisfiable. We give the definitions
here, leaving the details of the proof to the reader. Given a set V of formulas, let V/Ki = {ϕ |
Kiϕ ∈ V }. Let C be the set of all maximal consistent sets of formulas of LKDn (Σ). For V ∈ C, let
V/Obi = {p | Obi(p) ∈ V }. We define ≈i over C, for every i, by taking V ≈i U if and only if
V/Ki ⊆ U . We can check that ≈i is an equivalence relation for every i, assuming the axioms K1–
K5, just like in the proof of Lemma A.1. We can also check that if V ≈i U , then V/Obi = U/Obi,
and that for all ψ, if V ≈i U , then Xiψ ∈ V if and only if Xiψ ∈ U .
As mentioned, this is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 4.1, in that the satisfying model is
built from maximally consistent sets of formulas. However, it is not simply a direct generalization.
For Theorem 4.1, it was sufficient to consider a single equivalence class of the relation ≈ as the set
of states: all the states could be assumed to have the same observations, thus∼ could be taken to be a
universal relation in the canonical model. That this can be done is strongly related to Theorem B.1,
which says that if a formula of LK is satisfiable at all (in an LK-structure), it is satisfiable in a
structure with a universal relation. That result does not hold, however, when we consider multiple
agents. This makes the argument slightly more complex.
Let ϕ be a consistent formula of LKDn (Σ), and let Sub(ϕ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ (includ-
ingϕ itself). LetOϕ = {p | Obi(p) ∈ Sub(ϕ), for some i},Xϕ = {ψ | Xiψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), for some i},
and Kϕ = {ψ | Kiψ ∈ Sub(ϕ)}. Clearly, Oϕ, Xϕ, and Kϕ are finite sets. First, we claim that
any consistent set of formulas F (with F/Obi ⊆ Oϕ for all i) can be extended to a maximally
consistent set F ′ (with F ′/Obi ⊆ Oϕ for all i): construct the set F ′′ incrementally starting with F ,
adding Ob(p) for every observation p ∈ Oϕ if Ob(p) is consistent with the current set, and adding
¬Ob(p) for every observation p either not appearing in Oϕ or inconsistent with the current set; it
is easy to establish that F ′′ is consistent, so F ′′ is extensible to a maximally consistent set F ′ with
F ′/Obi ⊆ O
ϕ for all i. Let C(ϕ) be the set of all maximally consistent sets of formulas F with
F/Obi ⊆ O
ϕ for all i. We shall use C(ϕ) as our states. The fact that we consider C(ϕ) means,
roughly, that we consider only observations in Oϕ as relevant.
The set Xϕ is finite, so let S1, . . . , S2|Xϕ| be an enumeration of the subsets of Xϕ. Let
p1, . . . , p2|Xϕ| be a set of primitive propositions not in Oϕ, where we associate pi with Si. De-
fine the function tagX(V ) mapping every set V ∈ C(ϕ) to the primitive proposition corresponding
to the set (∪i(V/Xi)) ∩ Xϕ where V/Xi = {ψ | Xiψ ∈ V }. Thus, tagX(V ) gives the primitive
proposition corresponding to the formulas in Xϕ that appear under an Xi in V .
In a similar way, the set Kϕ is finite, so let T1, . . . , T2|Kϕ| be an enumeration of the subsets
of Kϕ. Let q1, . . . , q2|Xϕ| be a set of primitive propositions not in Oϕ or {p1, . . . , p2|Xϕ|}, where
we associate qi with Ti. Define the function tagK(V ) mapping every set V ∈ C(ϕ) to the prim-
itive proposition corresponding to the set (∪i(V/Ki)) ∩ Kϕ. Thus, tagK(V ) gives the primitive
proposition corresponding to the formulas in Kϕ that appear under an Ki in V .
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Since ϕ is consistent, there is a set V ϕ ∈ C(ϕ) with ϕ ∈ V ϕ. Define the deductive algorithmic
knowledge structure Mϕ = (Sϕ, πϕ,Dϕ1 , . . . ,D
ϕ
n) by taking
Sϕ = {(sV , {tagX(V ), tagK(V )} ∪ V/Ob1, . . . ,
{tagX(V ), tagK(V )} ∪ V/Obn) | V ∈ C(ϕ)}
πϕ((sV , O1, . . . , On))(p) =
{
true if p ∈ V
false if p 6∈ V
Dϕi = {({obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ V/Obi, ψ
T ) |
V ∈ C(ϕ),Xiψ ∈ Sub(ϕ),Xiψ ∈ V }.
We can check that Mϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n agents. Moreover, it
is easy to check that if sV ∼i sU in Mϕ, then for all ψ ∈ Xϕ, Xiψ ∈ V if and only if Xiψ ∈ U .
(Indeed, if sV ∼i sU , then tagX(V ) = tagX(U), and the result follows from the choice of tags.)
Clearly, we also have that if V ≈i U , then sV ∼i sU : we already know that V ≈i U implies
V/Obi = U/Obi, and V ≈i U means that the same Xiψ formulas are in V and U , and therefore,
we also have tagX(V ) = tagX(U), and similarly the same Kiψ formulas are in V and U and
tagK(V ) = tagK(U), and thus sV ∼i sU . Moreover, we have that if sU ∼i sV , then the same Kiϕ
are formulas are in U and V , since tagK(U) = tagK(V ).
We can prove, adapting the proof of Theorem 4.1, that for all sV ∈ Sϕ and all subformulas
ψ ∈ Sub(ϕ), (Mϕ, sV ) |= ψ if and only if ψ ∈ V . Here are the interesting cases of the induction.
For Obi(p), first assume that (Mϕ, sV ) |= Obi(p). This means that p ∈ V/Obi (since
tagX(V ), tagK(V ) 6∈ O
ϕ
, we cannot have p = tagX(V ) or p = tagK(V )), and thus Obi(p) ∈ V .
Conversely, if Obi(p) ∈ V , then p ∈ V/Obi, so that (Mϕ, sV ) |= Obi(p).
Now, consider a deductive algorithmic knowledge formula Xψ. First, assume that we have
(Mϕ, sV ) |= Xiψ. By definition, {obi(tagX(V )), obi(tagK(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) | p ∈ V/Obi} ⊢Dϕi
ψT . If ψ is Obi(p) for some p ∈ V/Obi (we cannot have p = tagX(V ) or p = tagK(V ), by
choice of tags), then (Mϕ, sV ) |= Obi(p), and thus Obi(p) ∈ V by the induction hypothesis; by
X2, XiObi(p) ∈ V . Otherwise, consider the derivation of ψT . By examination of Dϕi , the last rule
in this derivation must have obi(tagX(V )) in the premise (since there is a single tag in the premise
of every rule, and the tag at state V is tagX(V )). By definition of Dϕi , this means that Xiψ ∈ V ,
as required. Conversely, assume that Xiψ ∈ V . By definition of Dϕi , ({obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) |
p ∈ V/Obi}, ψ
T ) ∈ Dϕi , and thus {obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) | p ∈ V/Obi} ⊢Dϕi ψ
T
, meaning
that (Mϕ, sV ) |= Xiψ.
For a knowledge formula Kiψ, the argument is similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Completeness follows from the fact that ϕ ∈ V ϕ and ϕ ∈ Sub(ϕ), so that (Mϕ, sV ) |= ϕ, and
thus ϕ is satisfiable.
Theorem 6.3. The axiomatization AXn augmented with axioms AXD1n , . . . ,AXDnn is sound and
complete for LKDn (Σ) with respect to MD1,...,Dn⊆(Σ).
Proof. Soundness is again straightforward. For completeness, we prove the equivalent statement
that if ϕ is consistent then ϕ is satisfiable in some structure in MD1,...,Dn(Σ). The procedure is
exactly the one that is used to prove Theorem 6.2, except that we construct the deductive systems
Dϕ1 , . . . ,D
ϕ
n differently.
We simply indicate where the proof differs from that of Theorem 6.2, and let the reader fill
in the details. We construct, for a given ϕ, a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure with n
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agents Mϕ = (Sϕ, πϕ,Dϕ1 , . . . ,D
ϕ
n), where Sϕ and πϕ are constructed as in Theorem 6.2, and
Dϕ1 , . . . ,D
ϕ
n are obtained by taking Dϕi to be
Di ∪ {({ob(tagX(V ))} ∪ V/Obi, ψ
T ) |
V ∈ C(ϕ),Xiψ ∈ Sub(ϕ),Xiψ ∈ V }.
Mϕ is a deductive algorithmic knowledge structure in MD1,...,Dn⊆(Σ). As in the proof of Theo-
rem 4.2, we can show that if {obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) | p ∈ V/Obi} ⊢Di ψT , for some ψ ∈ Xϕ,
then there is a rule {obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) | p ∈ V/Obi} ⊲ ψT in D
ϕ
i . The argument is quite
similar, by showing that if {obi(tagX(V ))} ∪ {obi(p) | p ∈ V/Obi} ⊢Di ψT , then Xiψ must be in
V . Once this is established, the rest of the proof follows that of Theorem 6.2.
Theorem 6.4. If n ≥ 2, the problem of deciding whether a formula ϕ of LKDn (Σ) is satisfiable in
Mn(Σ) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The proof is entirely analogous to that of Theorem 5.1, except that we use the modal logic
LKn rather than LK. We can define translations between LKDn (Σ) andLKn , and we can prove analogues
of Lemmas B.2 and B.3. We simply give the translations here, leaving the reader to fill in the details.
Let f be a formula of LKn . Let p1, . . . , pk be the primitive propositions appearing in f . We first
come up with an encoding of these primitive propositions into the language of Σ. For example, we
can take p1 to be true, p2 to be not(true), p3 to be not(not(true)), and so forth. Let tp be the term
encoding the primitive proposition p. Let fˆ be the formula obtained by replacing every instance of a
primitive proposition p in f by tp. Note that |fˆ | is polynomial in |f |, and that fˆ contains no instance
of the X operator. We can show that f is satisfiable in LKn-structures for n agents if and only if fˆ is
satisfiable in Mn(Σ), with a proof similar to that of Lemma B.2. This gives us an immediate lower
bound, as follows. Let f be an LKn formula. We know f is satisfiable if and only if fˆ is satisfiable
overMn(Σ) structures. Since the decision problem for LKn (n ≥ 2) is PSPACE-complete, the lower
bound of PSPACE follows.
Let ϕ be a formula of LKDn (Σ). The set T
g
Σ is countable, so let {pt | t ∈ T
g
Σ} be a countable
set of primitive propositions corresponding to the ground terms of TΣ. Similarly, for every i, the
set of formulas {Xiψ | ψ ∈ LKDn (Σ)} is countable, so let {qiψ | ψ ∈ LKDn (Σ)} be a countable
set of primitive propositions where qiψ corresponds to the formula Xiψ. Finally, let {rit | t ∈
T gΣ} be a countable set of primitive propositions where rit corresponds to the formula Obi(t). Let
ϕ˜ be the translation of ϕ obtained by replacing every occurrence of a term t in T gΣ by pt, every
occurrence of a formula Xiψ by the corresponding qiψ, and every occurrence of a formula Obi(t) by
the corresponding rir, in conjunction with formulas rit ⇔ Kirir for all observations Obi(t) appearing
in ϕ, formulas qiψ ⇔ Kiqiψ for all formulas Xiψ appearing in ϕ, and formulas rit ⇒ qiObi(t) for all
observations Obi(t) appearing in ϕ. Note that |ϕ˜| is polynomial in |ϕ|. We can show that ϕ is
satisfiable in Mn(Σ) if and only if ϕ˜ is satisfiable in an LKn-structure, using a proof similar to that
of Lemma B.3. This gives us an immediate upper bound for our decision problem: ϕ is satisfiable
if and only if ϕ˜ is satisfiable, so we can simply invoke the PSPACE algorithm for LKn satisfiability
on ϕ˜.
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